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1I. Introduction
1.1 Background of this master thesis
This study comes at the heels of the latest developments in EC competition law in the 
maritime transport sector. The application of the Lisbon Strategy to maritime transport 
has proven very controversial.1 Since June 2003, when the European Commission 
launched a consultation paper on the application of articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
to maritime transport, major changes have been taking place. The “old” rules were no 
longer considered to provide a suitable framework for the sector, given the new market 
conditions and the international legislative developments, and, on top of that, the block 
exemption from the competition rules that liner conference operators benefited from
was no longer justifiable in the eyes of the Commission.
Following the adoption of Council Regulation 1419/2006 on September 2006, a new 
EC maritime competition policy is in force. This regulation provides for a transitional 
period of two years, ending 18 October 2008, after which liner conference practices 
will no longer be permitted under EC Competition Law.2 In addition to that, the 
regulation is revolutionary in yet another aspect: tramp shipping and cabotage 
services, two fields that were in an anomalous position in the former regulatory 
framework are now subject to the full enforcement powers of the Commission.3
The shipping industry has always shown a strong will to comply with the regulatory 
framework envisaged by the Commission. Stakeholders do not want to risk sanctions 
and disturbances to the daily running of their business are to be avoided. They have, 
already from the beginning of this debate, asked for clear guidance from Brussels to 
adapt to the regulatory changes. Therefore, even if sector-specific guidance is very 
rarely provided, the Commission acceded to supply the shipping industry with a tool to 
  
1 The Lisbon Strategy, set out by the European Council in Lisbon in 2000, is a development plan for the 
EU, which has as one of its points to promote competition in some key sectors, among those, transport.
2This transitional period of two years is not applicable to tramp nor cabotage. Theoretically, with the 
adoption of Regulation 1419/2006, the Commission effectively acquired enforcement powers in these 
sectors.
3 Before the new regulation only NCAs in each Member State had enforcement powers as per art 84 EC
2evaluate its practices and has recently published Guidelines “on the application of 
article 81 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport”.4
The period in which this thesis was written, summer 2008, was an extremely relevant 
point in the timeline of the application of maritime competition law for two main 
reasons. On the one hand, the two-year transitional period provided for by the 
Regulation 1419/2006 for the repeal of the block exemption for liner shipping was 
about to end (18 October 2008). On the other, with the publication on the 1st of July of 
the final version of the Guidelines on the application of Article 81 EC Treaty to 
maritime transport services, the industry was provided with a brand-new tool to 
evaluate its compliance with EC Competition law.
1.2 Purpose and sources of the work
In this study, one of the most crucial questions that have come up at this stage of the 
regulatory process will be addressed, namely: what impact does the new EC maritime 
transport competition policy have on tramp shipping and on the most usual 
cooperation form in the tramp shipping sector:  shipping pools? 
During the last years, legal literature has followed this debate, and has been updated to 
reflect changes in the regulatory framework focusing on liner conferences; 
nevertheless, after accepting the inevitability of the repeal of the block exemption, 
other relevant legal issues, as the above mentioned, have started attracting attention. 
The primary sources of law in this work are the EC Treaty provisions and ECJ case 
law. However, shipping is particularly poor on ECJ jurisprudence, not because of the 
lack of disputes, but because the parties involved are neither interested in an open 
discussion, nor in being subject to the high fines imposed by the Commission. This 
provokes that the big majority of disputes do not end in the courts. There are plenty of 
individual decisions in this field; specially Commission decisions on the application of 
competition rules to joint ventures, nevertheless, such decisions are based on the 
contextual characteristics of each undertaking and in the market they are operating in. 
  
4 Documents available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/maritime/
3Only general principles may be extracted from these decisions, and, extrapolating 
them to other cases may prove artificial and ineffective.
Other sources such as guidelines issued by the Commission and Commission Notices 
are important interpretational aids to the regulations adopted by the Commission. 
However, they are not sources of law. In this field, several relevant guidelines and 
notices have been published, among them: Guidelines on the applicability of Article 
81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, Notices on the Definition of 
the Relevant Market and on Agreements of Minor Importance, Guidelines on the 
Effect on Trade concept contained in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Guidelines on 
the application of article 81 (3) of the Treaty, and last but not least, the draft and the 
final version of the Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 to Maritime Transport.
Other sources consulted include stakeholders’ reports commenting the draft 
Guidelines on the application of article 81 to maritime transport, other submissions 
published by the Commission in their website, such as reports, memos or press 
releases, and, last but not least, legal literature and presentations on the subject.
1.3 Structure
The content of this master thesis can be divided in two thematic blocks. Firstly, 
chapter II addresses the tramp shipping sector, commenting its definition, its evolution 
through the legislative developments, its status in the EC competition legislative 
framework and its market definition; and secondly, chapters III and IV. Chapter III 
deals with shipping pools analyzing their main characteristics while chapter IV 
examines the application of article 81 EC Treaty to shipping pools. I have chosen to 
carry out the analysis on this article because it is the most relevant of the recent 
competition regulatory changes in the EC maritime law. This means that the 
competition analysis of shipping pools is carried out avoiding the analysis of article 82
EC Treaty, and also avoiding the study of shipping pools that, being full function joint 
ventures, fall into the merger rules.
4II. The tramp shipping sector
2.1 What is tramp shipping?
2.1.1 The earliest developments of the concept of tramp shipping
While the terms “liner services” and “liner conferences” have a long history beginning 
in 1875 when the first liner conference started its activities between the UK and 
Calcutta, the term “tramp shipping services” is a relatively new concept.
This concept was originally built upon the dichotomy between liner and tramp 
services, as the first definitions show.5 Later, especially after the Second World War, 
national states’ approach of liner conferences became increasingly critical. This 
process culminated with the adoption of the 1974 UNCTAD Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences, that intended to regulate Conferences’ practices and which entered 
into force in 1983. It is in this code that the first legal definition of liner conferences is 
found.
With several members of the EC becoming parties to the UNCTAD Code, and with 
the accession of important shipping nations to the European Union, such as the UK, 
and especially Greece, the EC was forced to adapt its internal legislation to these new 
circumstances and to come up with some political concessions. This resulted in the 
publication of a new maritime policy in 1985 and in the adoption of a package of 
regulations concerning maritime transport, among those, Regulation 4056/86, which is 
by many regarded as a political victory of Greece’s bargaining while entering the EC. 6
It was also in the context of this process, that a need for a classification of the different 
segments of the maritime industry arose, and even more, that the creation of a legal 
definition of tramp services started to take form.
  
5 Fayle (1932) p. 254
6 Progress towards a Common Transport Policy (1985)
52.1.2 The first legal definition
The first legal definition of tramp shipping was the result of a vivid discussion during 
the process of enactment of Regulation 4056/86, which is recorded in several working 
papers. Originally, in the first proposal, the Commission divided the maritime sector in 
“bulk” and “liner services”, a segmentation that proved too simplistic and too far from 
reflecting the complex reality of the sector.7 This definition was for many taken as an 
evidence of the Commissions’ lack of knowledge of the sector, a fact that the 
Commission itself admitted in later submissions.8
It was not long until such division was criticized, and in a opinion by the European 
Social Committee in 1983, it was argued that if “for the sake of simplicity” the 
maritime transport market had to fit into this bipartite division, the Commission must 
elaborate the concept of “bulk transport” further, and that moreover such a definition 
must be based on the nature of the transport and the intrinsic characteristics that made 
it different from liner conference services.9
Subsequently, in a second proposal, the Commission took into account the ESC critics 
and provided a first definition of tramp vessel services: “transport of goods as bulk or 
break-bulk in a vessel chartered to one or more shippers on the basis of a charter party 
or a booking-note for non-regularly and non-advertised sailings”.10
Yet, this second formulation was still not satisfactory, and the ESC came up with a 
new proposal for a definition. It was a much more general definition that focused not 
on the goods nor in the way such goods were carried, but on the contracts based on 
which the carriage took place. Moreover, the ESC definition incorporated a new 
element: the statement that freight is subject to free competition by the market forces.
Finally, with the enactment by the Commission of Regulation 4056/86, the first legal 
definition of tramp shipping services was published. This definition can be said to be a 
  
7 COM (81) 423
8 COM (85) 90
9 ESC (1983)
10 See note 8
6compromise between some elements of the Commissions’ proposals and some 
suggestions of the ESC:
Tramp vessel services means the transport of goods in bulk or in break 
bulk in a vessel chartered wholly or partly to one or more shippers on the 
basis of a voyage or time charter or any other form of contract that non-
regularly scheduled or non-advertised sailings where the freight rates are 
freely negotiated case by case in accordance with the conditions of 
supply and demand. 11
This definition is not widely accepted by the industry and it is considered imprecise 
for the purpose of defining such an intricate market. Among some of the critics that 
have been addressed to it, the main have been the following:  
-Tramp shipping as “transport of goods in bulk or in break bulk”: The industry does 
not support the view that factors as the type of vessels or the size of them are essential 
elements for the concept of tramp shipping. Each segment of the market has different 
transportation needs and provides different services; therefore, generalizing in this 
point must be avoided.
-Tramp shipping as “non-regularly scheduled and non-advertised”: The advertisement 
of shippings varies from the different segments of the market (i.e. from the dry bulk 
commodities market to the pure car carriers or reefers).12 However, the most 
problematic part of the definition is the “non-regular schedules”: is this affirmation 
tied to the vessel used for performing the contract or to the contract of affreightment 
itself? and, if the contract of affreightment is entered into for a certain period of time 
and establishes regular shippings, could this be considered regular scheduling?
Legal literature believes that terms such as “non-regular” and “unscheduled” are 
ambiguous and that they are too open for interpretation in the context of tramp 
shipping services.13 Indeed, sailings often have a certain frequency, especially, in long
contracts of affreightment, and also, loadings have to be agreed upon beforehand. 
  
11 Regulation 4056/86 art 1.3 (a)
12 Fearnley report (2006) p.11
13 Fearnley report (2006) p.11
72.1.3 Latest developments of the concept
Among the most recent milestones on the development of the legal concept of “tramp 
shipping services” the following can be cited: the 1994 TAA decision defines tramp 
shipping as “unscheduled sea transport […] that consists of unscheduled transport 
services using vessels chartered on demand and, nowadays, mainly involves the bulk 
transport of particular categories of goods (oil, ores, cereals, etc.) for which vessels are 
specially equipped”;14the Clarkson report states that the term “tramp shipping” is used 
to include “bulk and specialized shipping segments collectively”;15 the Fearnley report
provides that “in the sense in which it is normally used in the shipping industry, 
"tramp shipping" can be defined as the transport of a single commodity, which fills a 
single ship”16 and comments upon the legal definition given: “that definition was far 
more precise than an ordinary dictionary definition, or the general perception of the 
term”; 17 and last but not least, the Commission’s investigation on the bulk liquids’  
market case, which is the newest milestone in the understanding of the concept of 
tramp shipping services by the Commission. 18
After more than five years of investigation, several companies in the bulk liquid 
market received in the spring of 2007 a Statement of Objections which stated that the 
Commission would initiate investigation proceedings for alleged breach of the EC 
Treaty’s antitrust provisions.
One of the legal questions that was decisive for the outcome of the investigation was 
whether these companies were, indeed, carrying out “tramp shipping services”, and 
therefore, were not subject to the EC’s Commission enforcement powers pursuant to 
the regulation applicable at the time of the alleged breach (Regulation 4056/86). 
During the investigation process the shipowning companies presented to the 
Commission their activities and made an effort to clarify the scope of their practices. 
Finally, on the 8th of May 2008, the Commission concluded that “there was a 
  
14 TAA decision para 34
15 Clarkson report (2004) p.3
16 Fearnley report (2006) p. II
17 Fearnley report (2006) p. 11
18 See  2.5
8possibility that the services at stake were indeed tramp vessel services”, and 
consequently, had to close the case for lack of jurisdiction.19
The new Regulation 1419/2006 does not contain any definition of “tramp services” 
and merely goes on to restate the reasons why it was seen necessary to grant the 
Commission with enforcement powers in the tramp and cabotage sectors. The 
Commission offered to provide guidance to the tramp industry in the form of sector-
specific guidance, and has indeed, come up with guidelines on the 1st of July 2008. 
Such guidelines, after restating the definition provided by Regulation 4056/86, add “it 
is mostly the unscheduled transport of one single commodity which fills a vessel”20. 
Another remark on the Commissions’ view on the definition of tramp shipping 
services is provided by the press release published along with the guidelines where 
tramp shipping services are defined as “non-regular, maritime transport of bulk cargo 
that is not containerised, and include a range of economically important services, such 
as the transport of oil, agricultural and chemical products”. 21 This goes on to prove 
that the Commission is not willing to provide a new definition nor to rephrase the 
former criticized 4056/86 definition.
2.1.4 Conclusion on the legal definition of tramp shipping
To conclude, as for the legal definition of tramp shipping, the former provision on 1(3) 
of Regulation 4056/86 is still considered valid by the Commission. However, as such a 
definition extends long beyond the ordinary meaning given to it by the industry, many
grey areas are still identified. 
  
19 MEMO/08/297 (2008)
20 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) p.3
21 Memo 08/460 (2008)
92.2 Characteristics of tramp shipping
There are two reports published on the tramp shipping market by independent actors 
which analyze and fragment the sector, the so-called “Clarkson” and “Fearnley”
reports. 22 These reports are meant to explain and outline the complexities of the 
market, in order to provide the Commission with a better understanding of the sector 
that is to be used in the regulative process. They do not contain a detailed definition of 
tramp shipping services; neither do they intend to come up with one. Nevertheless,
what these two reports really do, and what they both agree upon, is that all of the 
tramp shipping segments have a series of key common characteristic features, these 
being:
-“Globally competitive markets
-Closeness to perfect competition model
-Different sub-market segments in response to customer needs
-Competition between sub-markets for cargo
-Volatile and unpredictable demand
-Many small entrepreneurial companies
-Global trade partners
-Ease of entry and exit
-Cost effectiveness
-Responsiveness to development of market and shippers needs”.23
These characteristic features are found in all of the different economic markets that 
integrate the tramp shipping sector, and are also factors that distinguish tramp shipping 
from liner services. It is remarkable that non-regular and non-advertised services is not 
cited as a characteristic, however, it could be explain by the problematic nature of such 
a characteristic.
  
22 Both reports available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/maritime/
23 Fearnley report (2006) p. 14
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2.3 The tramp shipping sector and the EC Competition rules
The regulation of tramp shipping has had a Copernican turn in recent decades. From a 
first period in which competition rules did apply to the tramp sector, but could not be 
enforced by the Commission, competition rules in tramp shipping are now fully 
enforceable with the adoption of Regulation 1419/2006. 
2.3.1 Former regulatory regime of tramp shipping: the anomalous exclusion of tramp 
services from the scope of Regulation 4056/86
During the 1960s and 1970s, the underlying line of thought was that maritime services 
were services of a special nature and that, due to the characteristics of the industry, 
they deserved a special treatment. Indeed, article 84 (2) EC Treaty stated that the 
Council could decide the application of special provisions for sea transport. This 
policy meant that while Regulation 17/62 enabled the application of the Commission 
of articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, transport was excluded from the scope of application 
pursuant to Regulation 141/62. The passing of Regulation 141/62 was a very special 
piece of legislation, which, limited the powers of the Commission to enforce 
competition rules in the transport sector. 
In this context, even the application of the material EC Competition rules to maritime 
transport was questioned. It was not until the ECJ ruling on the “French Merchant 
Seaman” case, that it was absolutely clear that competition rules in the EC treaty were 
applicable to “the whole range of economic activities”, including maritime transport. 
Therefore, according to this ruling, the only way to render one of the EC Treaties’ 
provisions inapplicable was by “an express clause in the Treaty to that effect”24. 
Thus, in 1986, with the passing of Regulation 4056/86, the Commission first applied 
competition rules to maritime transport; and this was so, even if competition rules 
were already applicable to all of the other transportation modes since 1968, by virtue 
of Regulation 1017/68.
  
24 Commission v. France, Goyder (2003) p.109
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Regulation 4056/86 contained material and procedural rules in relation to the 
application of competition rules to shipping services. The scope of application of these 
rules comprises “international maritime transport services from or to one or more 
Community ports, other than tramp vessel services”. This means that both cabotage 
and tramp shipping services were excluded from the scope of application of the 
regulation. The exclusion of these two types of services is not seen as properly 
justified, and it is thought that such exclusion was a mere result of the lack of the 
expertise of the Commission in the field at that point.
As a legal tool this regulation had certain particularities: first of all, it was adopted by 
the Council, while usually block exemption regulations are adopted by the 
Commission, this is considered as an evidence of the strong political dimension of the 
provision; secondly, it was a regulation that limited the powers of action the 
Commission; thirdly, this regulation contained a block exemption for liner conference 
that was unlimited (while all other block exemptions are limited in time).
Therefore, given that the EC Treaty’s competition rules apply to all sectors, also tramp 
services were subject to the competition rules, however, no enforcement powers were 
granted to the Commission in order to implement the competition provisions. This 
meant that if a service could qualify as tramp, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to 
take actions against it in the framework of Regulation 4056/86 and it was only up to 
national competition authorities to enforce the competition rules. 
The adoption of Regulation 1/2003 did not change the regulatory enforcement 
framework of tramp shipping services. Even if this so-called “modernization 
regulation” represented the new regulatory tool to apply EC Treaty’s competition rules 
to all sectors, article 32 of the Regulation contains an exclusion of tramp shipping and 
cabotage services. Thus not only did tramp services fall out of the enforcement powers 
of the Commission, and therefore, could only be enforced pursuant to 84 and 85 EC 
Treaty, but also due to this new decentralized system imposed by the Regulation, 
national authorities could not benefit from the cooperation schemes that Regulation 
1/2003 provided.
12
2.3.2 New regulatory regime under Regulation 1419/2006
When the revision process of Regulation 4056/86 took off, the focus was on the 
review of the block exemption for liner conferences, however, seen by many as an 
obiter of that, the unification of procedural regime in all segments of the maritime 
transport was also being discussed. As the process developed, it was clear that this 
lack of effective enforcement powers was a regulatory anomaly. Tramp shipping and 
cabotage were the only “remaining sectors to be excluded from the Community 
competition implementing rules” and this was no longer accepted. 25
In the preamble of the Regulation, the Commission justifies this change of route as 
follows:
The exclusion of tramp vessel services from Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
was based on the fact that rates for these services are freely negotiated on 
a case by case basis in accordance with supply and demand conditions. 
However, such market conditions are present in other sectors and the 
substantive provisions of Article 81 and 82 already apply to these 
services. No convincing reason has been brought forward to maintain the 
current exclusion of these services from the rules implementing article 81 
and 82 of the Treaty. 26
Therefore, now tramp shipping services fall within the enforcement powers of the 
Commission. This regulatory change will bring challenges for both parties of the 
industry: for the Commission it will be necessary to understand the structure and 
functioning of the market, not being influenced by the precedent found in liner 
services; while for the industry the fact that their practices will now fall within the 
enforcement powers of the Commission has to be accepted.27
  
25 Regulation 1419/2006 Preamble para. 12
26 Regulation 1419/2006 Preamble para. 13
27 Athanassiou (2008) p. 6
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2.4 The tramp shipping market
2.4.1 Market definition under EC Competition Law and tramp shipping
The definition of tramp shipping services had a greater relevance in the old days, when 
falling within the definition of tramp shipping meant avoiding the enforcement powers 
of the Commission. For the competition analysis, on the other hand, what is crucial is 
the definition of tramp shipping market. Such a definition is the preliminary tool for 
the application of the competition rules.
The Commission has provided general guidance on the definition of the relevant 
market for competition purposes.28 The main principle on establishing which is the 
relevant market and what it comprises is that: “the relevant market […] is established 
by the combination of the product and geographic markets.”29
The relevant product market includes “all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.30 On the other hand, the 
relevant geographical market comprises “the area in which the undertakings concerned 
are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions 
of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in 
those areas.31
The main difficulties that are faced while defining the relevant market in tramp 
shipping is that the term “tramp shipping” is legally provided a wider significance than 
the industry has ever given to it; and moreover, that “tramp shipping” is a generic term 
under which several different product markets are included. 
  
28 Notice on relevant markets (1997)
29 Notice on relevant markets (1997) para. 9
30 Notice on relevant markets (1997) para. 7
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2.4.2 Subdivision of the tramp shipping market
Traditionally the market has been divided into two broad segments: “bulk shipping”
including liquid, major and minor bulk; and “specialized shipping” covering 
refrigerated cargo, forest products, motor vehicles, gases transported as liquids and 
chemicals.32 The Fearnley report identifies, however, three market sectors: “liquid” 
and “dry” bulk, and “neo-bulk shipping”.33 The two first sectors are subdivided 
according to the cargo shipped, while the third one is divided according to the 
specificity of the vessel used.
These segments may provide useful guidance for the analysis of certain competition 
features such as the geographical scope of operation of the vessels, entry barriers and 
demand and supply substitutability of the vessels, nevertheless, these segments may 
not be considered autonomous markets. What also needs to be examined is the 
interchangeability or substitutability in all these segments of the market. For example, 
can a shipper of dry bulk use the services of a liquid bulk vessel instead? or can this 
shipper use different vessel independently of their draught? This will provide aid in 
assessing the relevant market in tramp shipping.
2.4.3 The relevant market in tramp shipping: product and geographical market
The relevant product and the geographical market provide a basis for calculating the 
total market power and the market shares.34
Firstly, in order to address the issue of the relevant market, the relevant product has to 
be delimited. In that aspect, the Guidelines on the application of articles 81 to 
maritime transport provide aid while defining the relevant product market in tramp 
shipping by stating that these elements should be taken into account:
    
31 Notice on relevant markets (1997) para. 8
32 Clarkson report (2004) p.12-14
33 ”Neo-bulk” is also known as ”specialized”, ”industrial”, or ”semi-liner”.
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-Demand substitution:  
The “main terms of an individual transport request” are “the starting point for defining 
relevant services markets in tramp shipping”.35 These elements and their negotiability 
will help assessing the interchangeability of services for the consumer. Moreover, the 
substitutability of the transport contract itself is a further element to take into account. 
Depending on whether the elements and the individual transport contracts are 
interchangeable, services may belong to the same relevant market or to a different one.
-Supply substitution:
The elements to take into account from the supply side are the physical and technical 
characteristics of the cargo; vessel types (if a vessel is able to adapt to transportation 
of different cargo types at a relatively low cost and in a relatively short time-frame, 
tramp shippers can compete in different cargo markets – such adaptability is relatively 
limited in specialized vessels); vessel size; and captive capacity.
Other factors to take into account in the analysis of the relevant market are the 
reliability of the service provider, security and safety and regulatory requirements.
The product definition has been criticized in the comments submitted to the draft 
guidelines. Several submissions consider that taking the contractual terms and the 
contracts as the starting point for the definition of the market product from the demand 
side will provide the wrong picture on the market, and that cargo and vessel types 
should be the starting point instead.36
Secondly, the geographical market definition should be tackled. On this issue, both 
the TAA and the Guidelines on maritime transport provide guidance. The TAA 
decision states that “the geographic market is the area in which the services defined 
above are marketed”;37 while the Guidelines outline that, notwithstanding the final 
    
34 Notice on relevant markets (1997) p.17
35 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) p.6
36 ECSA (2007) p. 10, AEDC (2007)  p.2, Hellenic Republic (2007) p.2.
37 TAA decision para.37
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definition of the relevant geographic market, “ports provide the first orientation for the 
definition of the relevant geographic market”.38
Port interchangeability may, nevertheless, be limited due to the characteristics of the 
vessel, draught, safety restrictions, environmental standards, etc. Repositioning, ballast 
voyages and imbalances in trade must also be taken into account while outlining the 
relevant market.
Critics addressed to this relevant geographical market remark that the relevant market 
is the global market or “world-regional”; and this is rooted in the fact that both from
the demand and from the supply side, ports in tramp shipping are usually 
interchangeable.39
Lastly, market shares must be taken into account. The calculation of market shares has 
had an increasingly importance with the adoption of the “de minimis doctrine” 
pursuant to article 81 EC Treaty.40 Moreover, market shares can also indicate 
dominance in the market in mergers and concentration levels.
The Commission states that several factors may be taken into account while 
determining the market shares in tramp shipping services, those being: (a) the number 
of voyages; (b) the parties' volume or value share in the overall transport of a specific 
cargo; (c) the parties' share in the market for time charter contracts; (d) data in relation 
to the parties' contract negotiations; (e) the parties' capacity shares in the relevant fleet 
(by vessel type and size).41
Calculating market shares in the tramp shipping market seems to be a troublesome 
task, given the lack of available information in the different markets of tramp 
shipping, the difficulty of identifying competition restraints on prices and demand 
from the supply side, the lack of data on sales of the products in relevant areas, and the 
interconnection with semi-liner trade and tramp shipping, among others.42
  
38 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) p.7
39 ECSA (2007) p. 11, AEDC (2007)  p.2
40 See 4.7
41 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) p.7
42 Fearnley report (2006) p. 285
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2.5 Conclusion
The definition of tramp shipping seemed to have much more relevance in the old days 
of Regulation 4056/86, when the distinction between tramp and liner services could 
mean that the block exemption for Liner Conferences could be applicable. With the 
passing of Regulation 1419/2006, this dual regime was abandoned and both sectors 
must now comply with the competition provisions of the EC treaty. However, the 
distinction between tramp and liner shipping is still relevant in other segments: for 
instance, in the context of consortia, where the block exemption is still in effect only 
applying to liner shipping; or in the context of an individual application of article 81 
(3) EC treaty where collaboration in tramp services may have its own beneficial 
aspects and may be different to those produced by collaboration schemes in liner
shipping.
Moreover, and even though the intention of the Commission seems to be that with 
adoption of Regulation 1419/2006 all the segments in the maritime transport market 
are now subject to its enforcement powers, a new question has arisen after the 
publication of the guidelines on maritime transport. 
In these guidelines, the Commission states that several characteristics render 
specialized transport different from tramp shipping, without further elaborating on 
their difference.43 Specialized services are said to involve “the provision of regular 
services for a particular cargo type.” These services are further characterized as 
provided “on the basis of contracts of affreightment using specialised vessels 
technically adapted and/or built to transport specific cargo”. If such services are 
regular, would not they be considered as liner services? If they are not liner services, 
can they be tramp? Does this mean that these services shall be treated differently than 
liner and tramp services? And if so, on which basis is that exclusion justifiable?
It could be that specialized services are in a regulatory limbo for the Commission;
however, it may also be that the Commission is merely stating that they are services of 
a different nature without intending to point at a different treatment. For all the debate 
that this interpretation could cause, and for other potential repercussions (i.e. regarding 
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consortia), this formulation should be either abandoned or the effects of the 
characterization of a service as “specialized transport” should be spelt out.
This new polemic issue seems to confirm that the term “tramp shipping services” as 
understood by the Commission is basically an intellectual construction with blurred 
boundaries and an uncertain scope that not even the Commission seems to have a clear 
picture of.  However, the recent outcome of the investigation on the bulk liquid market 
and the publication of the final guidelines seem to point to a more flexible and 
industry-friendly approach.
Such understanding of the industry is essential. If the final purpose of the EC 
competition policy is to contribute to the efficiency and growth of the European
economy, imposing inexistent barriers and unfavourable regulatory frameworks to a 
market that accounts for more than 80% of the goods that are nowadays carried does 
not seem to be the right way to go.
It is not viable to tie the tramp shipping market to a pen-made definition that is not 
even outlined nor agreed upon by the industry. Maritime transport is a sector that
evolves extremely quickly and therefore suitable maritime policies are essential, a 
proof of that being the fact that Regulation 4056/86 was repealed at the sweet age of 
20. How long it will take for the maritime transport sector to grow old of regulation
1419/2006, is a mystery; however, what is clear is that a flexible and industry-friendly 
approach to tramp shipping seems to be the only way forward for the understanding 
and satisfaction of all parties involved.
On the other hand, the definition of the relevant market is the starting point for the 
competition analysis, not only for assessing restraints of competition under article 81 
EC Treaty, but also for assessing the market dominance of an undertaking pursuant to 
article 82 EC Treaty, and last but not least, for addressing potential effects of structural 
changes under the Merger Regulation. 
    
43 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) Footnote 10 p.2
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Being a crucial starting point and such a complicated issue, the Commission should 
provide a much clearer tool for the definition and delimitation of the relevant products 
and geographical markets in tramp shipping. These issues have been addressed by two 
reports on the tramp shipping market and by several submissions commenting the draft 
guidelines in maritime transport services. The Commission should take into account 
the recommendations given in such papers.
Defining tramp shipping services is not an easy task. The complexity of the maritime 
transport market and the relationships between contractual parties must not be 
underestimated. The Commission has undertaken a very complex task while 
attempting to define and regulate “tramp shipping services”. From an earlier approach, 
that proved artificial and unsatisfactory, the Commission seems to be making progress 
in the understanding of the idiosyncrasy of the tramp industry. 
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III Tramp shipping pools
3.1 What is a tramp shipping pool?  
Shipping pools are the most common form of horizontal cooperation between carriers 
in tramp shipping and they operate in the vast majority of segments of the market, 
although in some segments there is no evidence of their existence (i.e. PCC pools in 
the neo-bulk segment).44
Not all the pools are identical, nor are their functions; nevertheless, some common 
features can be identified: 45
-The vessels appertaining to the pool are provided more or less with similar 
characteristics regarding tonnage, size and type of vessel.
-There is a central administration, in which a pool manager is appointed to be in 
charge of the daily operation of the pool. The standard tasks of the pool manager are 
the commercial management and operation of the fleet, and the negotiation of the 
freight rates. Depending on the nature of the pool, the pool manager can either be a 
separate company or one of the members of the pool. Technical management of the 
vessels and performance of the services are carried out individually by each member.
-The fleet is joint-marketed; this means that the group of vessels is marketed as a 
single entity, notwithstanding ownership.
-The freight rates are subject to the market forces: the pool manager negotiates the 
freight rates for the common fleet subject to the terms and conditions agreed in 
accordance with the ship owners’ operating instructions for the pool.
-There is a centralised system to allocate profits and to cover variable expenses. The 
allocation of profits is carried out pursuant to a system of “pool points”. Every vessel 
is assigned a number of points corresponding to its earning capacity for a fixed period.
  
44 Fearnley report (2006) p.268
45 Fearnley report (2006) p.245
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The total net profits of the pool (the sum of the net revenue -all hires, freights and 
other earnings, less all voyage and operation expenses) will then be divided by the 
total number of pool points for all the pool vessels. Finally, each shipowner will 
receive an amount equal to this average amount of points multiplied by the number of 
pool points awarded to their vessels per day.46
It is therefore possible to come up with a definition including all the common 
characteristics and provide a standard definition of shipping pool: 
A standard shipping pool is a type of horizontal cooperation between carriers that 
brings together a number of similar vessels under different ownership and that is
operated under the single administration of a pool manager who markets the pool 
vessels as a single cohesive fleet.
3.2 Aims and objectives of tramp shipping pools47
There are several reasons that supported the creation of shipping pools. Nevertheless, 
the main reason was the search for a more efficient fleet deployment and the appealing 
possibility of risk distribution between pool members in such a volatile market.
Being a member of a shipping pool means for the vessels individually owned that the 
trading performance can be optimized. Coordination of fleet voyages and contracts of 
affreightment reduces the number of ballast voyages and dead freight. Moreover, the 
flexibility of carriers to provide services increases and by marketing bigger and 
stronger fleets, larger customers can be served and larger contracts can be obtained, 
things that are difficult to achieve in such a highly fragmented market by each member 
of the pool itself. Furthermore, in the cargo interest side, charterers can benefit from 
better capacity and more efficient services, better logistics, and a considerable 
reduction of the no show risk of the vessels. Last but not least, environmental 
considerations should also be taken into account. The reduction of ballast voyages and 
optimization of the performance of the fleet means a more environmental-friendly 
shipping of the vessels that are members of a pool.
  
46 Falkanger (2004) p.153
47 Lauritzen Presentation Shipping Pools BSEC
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3.3 Types of tramp shipping pools
Even if the classification and categorization of shipping pools can not possibly be 
exhaustive, given the heterogeneity of the functional and structural features, two main 
criteria are used to classify pools: the segment of the market they are operating in and
their organizational structure. 
According to the Fearnley report, shipping pools are found in the following segments 
of the market:
-Liquid bulk (Tanker and LPG Pools)
-Dry bulk (Pacific basin, CSL International, CTM, Island View Shipping and 
Lauritzen Bulkers, Torvald Klaveness Group, JJ Ugland Bulk Tranport, IMC 
Pools)
-Neo-bulk (Reefer pools, OHBC pools)
On the other hand, pursuant to their organizational structure, shipping pools could be 
divided in member-controlled, pools that are in reality controlled by their members; 
and administration controlled pools that are “operated, organized and controlled by an 
external administration”. 48
3.4 Contractual basis 
The consensus of the parties while entering into a shipping pool structure is normally 
evidenced in a pool agreement. This agreement provides a legal framework for the 
cooperation of the parties which can either be all-embracing or which can merely deal 
with the fundamental features of cooperation.49 No standard contract form is found in 
order to draft a pool agreement, and therefore each contract reflects the free will of the 
parties during the negotiation process. 
A pool contract is normally entered into by the parties that will become members of 
the pool and the pool manager, however, this is not always the case and individual 
  
48 Fearnley report (2006) p. 252-272
49 Packward (1995) p. 117
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owners can also sign separate identical contracts between the pool manager and each 
shipowner, for instance.
The usual content of the contract includes the object of the cooperation, the pool 
structure, the duties of the pool members, the specification of the organization, the 
standard chartering terms, confidentiality and hardship clause, and finally, clauses on 
dispute resolution and governing law. Further technicalities of the agreement may be 
regulated in separate annexes such as the enumeration of the number of pool vessels 
and pool contracts, quality and maintenance standards of the vessels, charterparties to 
be used in the marketing of the fleet and earning value of the pool vessels.
Among the “standard” contractual terms, several of them may cause competition 
concerns at first sight, the main ones being:  non-competition clauses, information 
exchange agreements, capacity deployment and price agreements, termination 
provisions, lay-up clauses and restrictions to access to the pool.50
3.5 Conclusion
Shipping pools are a type of horizontal cooperation between carriers in the tramp
shipping market that arose due to the characteristics of the tramp market and due to the 
need of the carriers to deploy a more efficient fleet and more competitive services. 
Even if no standard pool model exists, apart from the one created for analytical 
purposes, it seems that pools were established for all the right reasons and that this 




IV. Competition analysis of shipping pools under article 81 EC
4.1. Introduction
A common competition policy has been one of the fundamental pillars in the creation 
of an internal European market. Competition rules were in place since the earliest 
stages in the EU integration process.51 Nevertheless, the uniform implementation of 
competition rules is quite a recent achievement. Some sectors have benefited from 
particularly long-lived competition implementation exemptions, transport being the 
last policy area to be deprived of such a privilege.
The maritime transport sector, and per extension shipping pools, have always been 
subject to the primary material sources of EC Competition law, namely, Part III 
Chapter 1 of the EC Treaty, (articles 81 to 89).52 On the other hand, it is only recently 
that the sector has become bound by the general procedural competition framework 
contained in Regulation 1/2003.53
It is necessary to reiterate, before going deeper into the competition analysis of these 
cooperation agreements that no universal model of shipping pool exists and that the 
concept of shipping pool used is the so-called “standard shipping pool.”54 Such 
concept will be used as a basis to assess compliance of pools with articles 81 and 82 
EC treaty; yet, the competition analysis has to be undertaken in a case-by-case basis 
and each shipping pool has to be individually analyzed in order to assess its 
compliance with EC competition rules. 
Article 81 (ex. art 85) EC Treaty is structured in three paragraphs. In short, the content 
and structure of the article is as follows:
-Article 81 (1) establishes a prohibition of anticompetitive practices; 
  
51 Treaty of Rome, part III
52 Notwithstanding any express exclusion, the EC Treaty is in principle applicable to “the whole range 
of economic activities” in the EC market. (French Seaman case, Goyder (2004) p.109. See 2.3.1
53 This was a result, as explained in 2.3, of the adoption of Regulation 1419/2006.
54 See 4.1
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-Article 81 (2) spells out the legal effects of these anticompetitive practices, namely, 
that such agreements will be “automatically void”;
-and article 81 (3) provides for an exemption of the prohibition contained in article 81 
(1) whenever four cumulative conditions are given.
Finally, article 81 EC Treaty provides for exemplification purposes a non-exhaustive 
list of  agreements that are presumed to violate this article per se: directly or indirectly 
fixing prices (purchase or selling) or any other trading conditions; limiting and 
controlling “production, markets, technical development or investments”; sharing 
markets or sources of supply;  applying different trading conditions to equivalent 
transactions with different trading parties; and concluding contracts subject to the 
acceptance of other parties or placing supplementary obligations that have no link to 
the conclusion of the contract in the first place.
The Commission, being aware of the difficulties that the interpretation of article 81 EC 
Treaty entails in the maritime transport sector, has provided sector specific guidance, 
that deals in some paragraphs with shipping pools55. Moreover, a notice containing 
“Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements” was published in 2001. Such guidelines assess horizontal 
cooperation in the light of article 81 EC treaty, however, they expressly provide their 
declaratory nature when, as it is the case in the maritime transport, sector-specific 
rules are found. In such cases they must be considered useful background. 56
4.2 Application of article 81 (1) EC to Shipping Pools
For Shipping Pools to contravene article 81 (1) EC Treaty four conditions have to be 
fulfilled: 
1) The shipping pool has to fall within the definition of “undertakings” or “association 
of undertakings” pursuant to 81 (1) EC Treaty
  
55 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) p.14-17
56 Guidelines horizontal cooperation (2001)  p.2
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2) The pooling agreement entered into by the shipowning companies must be an 
“agreement between undertakings, a decision by association of undertakings or a 
concerted practice” in terms of 81 (1) EC Treaty.
3) Pooling agreements must affect trade within the Member States.
4) Pooling agreements must also have the object or effect to “prevent, restrict or 
distort competition within the common market”.57
The first three requirements have limited relevance for our analysis, as they are not 
disputed issues within shipping pools; however, they deserve a brief mention.
4.2.1 Are shipping pools “agreements of undertakings, decisions by association of 
undertakings or concerted practices”?
At a first stage, it should be analyzed whether shipping pools can fall within the 
category of undertakings under EC competition law, if this is so, the next step is to 
determine whether they qualify as agreements of undertakings, decisions by 
association of undertakings, or concerted practices.
The term “undertaking” is not defined in the EC Treaty, even so, the meaning of this
term has been widely discussed in EC jurisprudence. The ECJ provides a definition of 
the term undertaking in the ruling Höfner v Macrotron.58 An undertaking is “every 
entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in 
which it is financed”. This functional approach can be developed further, and legal 
literature has summarized all the existent jurisprudence and identified three positive 
requirements of the relevant economic activity, these are: that the entity “must offer 
goods or services to the market”, “bear the economic or financial risk of the 
enterprise” and “have the potential to make profit from the activity”.59
  
57 EC Treaty art 81 (1)
58 Höfner v Macroton para. 21
59 Odudu (2007) p. 26, Siragusa (2007) p.31
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Shipping companies participating in pools are therefore undertakings in the meaning
of article 81 (1) EC Treaty as they are engaged in shipping, which is an economic 
activity, and they also fulfil the three criteria of the economic activity. First of all, they 
can be said to provide services in the market at two different levels: in the downstream 
market, by providing “relevant maritime transport services” to their clients, and also in 
the upstream market, by “making vessels available to other owners or operators”.60
Secondly, they bear the economic or financial risk of the enterprise and they have the 
potential to make profits from their activities. In the case of shipping pools a
centralised system that allocates pools profits and covers variable expenses exists.
Therefore, shipping pools are undertakings in the meaning of the article.
The next step is, thus, to determine whether shipping pools can fall in one of the three 
categories of agreements that article 81 (1) EC Treaty is addressed to. If this article
was only to apply to agreements as it is generally understood; it could be quite easy to 
escape the law.61 Therefore, these potential gaps are filled by clarifying that it applies 
to “agreements between undertakings”, “decisions by association of undertakings” and 
“concerted practices”.62
An agreement is reached when there is a sufficient consensus between the parties in 
order to commit themselves to a common purpose. 63 The most common way of 
evidencing an agreement is by way of a written contract; nonetheless, there is also 
jurisprudence that has recognised verbal or partly-verbal agreements, “gentlemen 
agreements”, or even cases when the contract was never signed or dated. This was 
done by looking at the conduct of the parties.64
A decision by an association of undertakings is “any provision of the rules of a trade 
association or any decision or recommendation made under those rules either for or by 
its members, or arrived at informally within the frame-work which they provide”. 65
  
60 Fearnley report (2006) p. 276
61 Whish (2001) p. 91
62 EC Treaty art 81 (1)
63 Goyder (2004) p.66
64 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission Summary para. 9, Kerse (2004) 11, Atka A/S v BP Kemi A/S
65 Goyder (2004) p. 67, Odudu (2007) p. 70
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Lastly, “concerted practises” is the widest and vaguest of all the three terms and tries 
to include any kind of cooperative agreement that can not be placed either under the 
term “agreement” or under “decision”. This concept applies when there is not a formal 
agreement between the parties. There is no need to include an actual plan of neither 
action nor proofs that such a plan is entered into.66
Even if the Commission has stated in the Polypropylene case that “agreements” and 
“concerted practices” are different concepts, there is not much point in trying to 
elucidate the limits between an agreement and a concerted practice and this is so 
because usually the Commission focuses on the collusive practice and not so much on 
how to classify it. This point is explained in the PVC II case:
In the context of a complex infringement which involves many producers 
seeking over a number of years to regulate the market between them, the 
Commission cannot be expected to classify the infringement precisely, 
for each undertaking and for any given moment, as in any event both 
those forms of infringement are covered by article 81 [1] of the Treaty.67
Shipping pools are normally organized as a separate entity from its members, and this 
organization can take different forms. Nevertheless, there is in the big majority of 
cases a written pool agreement that reflects among other things, the rights and duties 
of the parties to the pool. This is normally so because the signing of a contract 
provides more legal certainty to the cooperation scheme of the parties.
Therefore, a pooling agreement would normally fall within the above definition of 
agreement under article 81 EC Treaty. Furthermore, even in the case that a pool 
agreement was not able to be evidenced, if the conduct of the pool members reflected 
a cooperation scheme, then, that agreement, too, could fit in the definition of 
agreement. Concerted practices could exist in cases where carriers knowingly have 
cooperation schemes between them without reaching an agreement.This means that
shipping pools will normally fall either in the wording of agreements of undertakings 
or in concerted practices.
  
66 See Commission Decision Polypropylene Cartel, Commission Decision PVC case and Commission 
Decision LdPE case
67 Commission Decision PVC case para. 696
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Finally, it is important to point out that the nature of the agreement is also important. If 
the cooperation under the pool agreement amounts to a concentration within the 
meaning of the merger regulation, i.e when it is drafted as a full-function joint venture 
agreement, then it will fall outside the scope of article 81 EC Treaty.
4.2.2 Are the object and the effect test established in article 81 (1) cumulative?
Article 81 (1) EC Treaty establishes a prohibition of the agreements that have as their 
object or effect to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common market”.
68
Jurisprudence has clarified that “object” and “effect” are not cumulative requirements, 
and that, at a first stage, it is necessary to assess whether an agreement has the object 
to prevent, restrict or distort competition. In the STM case, the ECJ ruled that it in 
order to assess the object or purpose of the agreement, its express provisions have to 
be considered in their economic context.69 This point has also been illustrated in the 
European Night Services case, where it was stated that: 
it must be borne in mind that in assessing an agreement under article 81 (1), 
account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it functions […] 
unless it is an agreement containing obvious restrictions of competition such 
as price fixing, market-sharing or the control of outlets […] In the latter 
case, such restrictions may be weighed against their claimed pro-
competitive effects only in the context of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, with a 
view to granting an exemption from the prohibition of Article 81 (1). 70
Thus, if the outcome of the assessment is that the agreement had, indeed, this object, 
then, there is no need to evaluate its effects.71If on the other hand, the provisions do 
not reveal the existence of object competition restrictions, then, the next step is the 
analysis of its incidence of the effects in the common market.
Some contractual restrictions are a priori presumed to affect competition, for example, 
the list of agreements that are found under article 81 (1) EC Treaty sections a) to e). 
  
68 EC Treaty art 81 (1) 
69 Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm para. 249
70 European Night Services v Commission para. 136
71 Consten and Grundig v Commission para. 343, Kerse (2004) 12
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Over this list of presumed practices a), price fixing, and c), market sharing, are the 
main violations that could be potentially entered into by shipping pools. However, the 
rest of the practices can not be categorically excluded. For instance, a priori, the big 
majority of shipping pools do not restrict output in the market, as the pooled resources 
contribute to provide consumers with a wider range of choice in the market. 
Nevertheless, it can not be excluded that the output may be reduced, as for example, 
when shipping pools would be forced to restrict output in order to achieve acceptable 
freight rates in the market. Consequently, the potential competition restrictions and 
their effects in the common market must be analyzed on a case by case basis.
4.3. Competition constraints by object in pool agreements
If a tramp pool imposes a hardcore restriction on competition, it could be considered 
to have the object to restrict competition.72
In order to assess the potential competition concerns on the object of pool agreements 
the following questions are relevant: do shipping pools engage in price fixing?; are 
shipping pools joint production or joint selling schemes?; and, are shipping pools 
sharing the market, and consequently, falling under article 81 (1) e) EC Treaty?
4.3.1 Do shipping pools engage in price fixing?
Article 81 EC Treaty provides a list of practices that are presumed to be 
anticompetitive practices per se under EC Competition Law. 73 Among them, the first 
category of agreements is agreements that “directly or indirectly fix purchase or 
selling prices or any other trading conditions”. 
Such agreements are usually, after the decision in “European Night Services”, 
considered to have the object of restricting competition. Yet, this position 
“oversimplifies the law” as there is also jurisprudence that, despite the existence of 
one of the so-called “per se” restrictions has considered the effects of the 
  
72 Whish (2001) p.110
73 Siragusa (2007) p. 41
31
agreements.74 Examples of this are found in Visa International Multilateral exchange, 
a case in which despite the fact that banks agreed the commission to be charged to
Visa card users, the Commission decided that this did not constitute a restriction by 
object, but by effect.75
Whether this provision is applicable to vertical and horizontal agreements is clear after 
the ruling in Italy v Council and Commission, which established that this prohibition is 
applicable to both -horizontal and vertical agreements.
The Guidelines on the application of article 81 to maritime transport also deal with this 
subject outlining that “pool agreements between competitors limited to joint selling 
have as a rule the object and effect of coordinating the pricing policy of these 
competitors”; while a footnote attached adds that “price-fixing activities of 
independent ship-brokers when fixing a vessel do not fall under this category”.76
This paragraph has indeed suffered a major transformation from its original wording in 
the draft Guidelines, when it read:
If a pool agreement between competitors has as its object the restriction 
of competition by means of price fixing, output limitation or sharing of 
markets or customers it will fall under Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
Agreements between competitors involving price fixing will always fall 
under Article 81(1) of the Treaty irrespective of the market power of the 
parties.77
The wording of this paragraph in the final version of the Guidelines is less categorical. 
The same wording in the draft guidelines states that the agreements between 
competitors involving price fixing will always fall under article 81 (1) of the Treaty, 
while now the paragraph reads that pool agreements between competitors limited to 
joint selling will as a rule have the object and effect of coordinating their pricing 
policy. However, as mentioned above, if those agreements have the object to restrict 
competition, there is no need to show that they have the effect of doing so.78
  
74 Whish (2001) p.114 
75 Visa Multirateral case
76 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) p.14
77 Draft guidelines maritime transport (2007) p. 14
78 See 4.2.3
32
Furthermore, in the final drafts all mentions of output limitation or sharing of markets 
in shipping pools are erased.
The concept of price fixing is quite wide and any kind of price fixing is caught, both 
directly and indirectly. Examples of this are found in EC jurisprudence such as the 
Polypropylene case, where tables of agreed target prices for different markets were 
found; British Sugar, where a collaboration scheme that lead to high pricing was 
discovered, and the extreme Pre-Insulated Pipes which was defined as one of the 
worse cartel cases in the EC history with elements of price fixing, market sharing, 
information sharing and strategies to virtually eliminate any other competitor in the 
market; and last but not least, in the Greek Ferries case, where several ferry operators 
were found to engage in price fixing on their routes between Italy and Greece.79
If this jurisprudence is extrapolated to shipping pools it can be affirmed that the danger 
of price fixing appears when shipping pools engage in systematic rate fixing, if pool 
members engage in collusive tendering eliminating the competition in the market, if
pool members offer the same discounts on routes, or if there is an isolation of a 
national market, and if this has a consequence higher prices in the market. It looks as if
in the normal scheme of price fixing cases, the final objective is that prices in the 
market are increased or that competitors are not able to bring prices to a lower level. 
This is not the case in the normal scheme of shipping pools, where the market is the 
driving force behind the prices and the output is increased. Moreover, the Commission 
in the Woodpulp case, considered that even if there was a concentration of producers 
both on the sale and the purchase price which infringed article 81 (1) EC Treaty, the 
system per se did not infringe the provision. 80 This is another proof that potential price 
violations have to be examined in their industrial context.81
  
79 Commission Decision Polypropylene Cartel, Suiker Unie v Commission,  Pre-Insulated Cartel case, 
Commission v Minoan Lines
80 Commission Decision Woodpulp
81 Siragusa (2007) p.46
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The industry refuses to accept that “price fixing” could be considered as a 
characteristic feature of the functioning of a shipping pool and has repeatedly argued 
that the pool manager is indeed a “price-taker” and not a price fixer.82  
First of all, the characteristics of the tramp market provide for a bidding system in 
order for the price to be agreed. It is not the pool manager that sets a price; the price is 
actually agreed through a negotiation process, a bidding process, between the 
customer and the pool manager. This is a process that takes into account the nature of 
the service offered, the ship to be used and the conditions of the supply and demand at 
that point of time in the market. This is what is meant with the affirmation that the 
pool manager is not a price-fixer but merely a “price-taker”. 
Therefore, price-fixing should not be considered as a characteristic feature of the 
standard shipping pools, as the conditions in the market and the role of the pool 
manager do not seem to constitute anticompetitive practices per se. Nevertheless, it 
can not be excluded that naked price fixing is found in individual shipping pools, and 
that would normally classify as an agreement that has the object of restricting 
competition under article 81 (1) a) EC Treaty; however, even there, the pool may still 
fall within article 81 (3) EC Treaty.
4.3.2 Are shipping pools joint production or joint selling schemes?
Linked to the question of whether shipping pools have per se an anticompetitive object 
is also the classification of shipping pools as either joint production or joint selling. 
This is indeed an extremely relevant question in terms of competition law as if 
services are considered to be jointly produced, a block exemption may apply in some 
cases, while if not, individual self-assessment is the only potential way out left.
In order to find out whether shipping pools are indeed horizontal cooperation 
agreements that fall in the category of joint production or joint selling, it is in the 
Guidelines on the application of article 81 to Horizontal agreements that guidance 
  
82 Torvald Klaveness Group submission (2007) para. 3.12, Intertanko (2007) para. 5.6, International 
Chamber of Shipping (2007) p.1
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should be sought. Moreover, the Guidelines on the application of article 81 to 
maritime transport also contribute to the debate.
The Guidelines on maritime transport establish that the “key feature of shipping pools 
is joint selling coupled with features of joint production” and that each pool has to be 
analyzed in the light of its “centre of gravity”.83 This approach to shipping pools has 
also been criticised in several stakeholders´ submissions regarding the publication of 
the draft maritime transport guidelines.84
Joint selling is one of the forms that a commercialisation agreement can take place, it 
involves that there is “a joint determination of all commercial aspects related to the 
sale of the product including price”; 85 moreover, a further characteristic of this type of 
agreements is that they “do not only intend to eliminate price, but also limit the choice 
of purchasers”.86 This does not seem to be a suitable category to place shipping pools 
at all, as first of all, and reiterating the above mentioned, the setting of the prices in 
shipping pools should not be considered “price-fixing” but “price-taking”; secondly, 
the final object of shipping pools is not pricing policy coordination; and, lastly, far 
from restricting the volume of services, output in the supply side can be generally said 
to increase.
Another category in which shipping pools could fall is “production agreements”. The 
term production agreements is said to “vary in scope and form”.87This term is used 
both for the production of goods and services, and it is said to include three different 
types of agreements: joint production, specialisation and sub-contracting agreements. 
Shipping pools could not fit in the descriptions of specialization and subcontracting 
agreements, however, the label “joint production” seems to be quite adequate. 
Joint production are “agreements whereby the parties agree to produce certain 
products jointly, (unilateral or reciprocal)”.88 Pursuant to article 81 (1) EC Treaty
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shipping pools seem to fit in the category of agreements that may fall under this 
article:
Production agreements that cannot be characterised as clearly restrictive 
or non-restrictive on the basis of the above factors may fall under Article 
81(1) and have to be analysed in their economic context. This applies to 
cooperation agreements between competitors which create a significant 
degree of commonality of costs, but do not involve hard core restrictions 
as described above.89
This leads again, to the analysis under article 81 (3) EC Treaty, where the four 
cumulative criteria for exemption must be satisfied. Even so, while assessing the 
efficiencies that production agreements can bring about, the Guidelines provide the 
following:
[…] It appears reasonable to provide for the exemption of such 
agreements which result in a restriction of competition up to a market 
share threshold below which it can, for the application of Article 81(3), 
in general, be presumed that the positive effects of production 
agreements will outweigh any negative effects on competition.
Therefore, agreements […] as joint production are block exempted 
(Specialisation block exemption Regulation) provided that they do not 
contain hard core restrictions and that they are concluded between parties 
with a combined market share not exceeding 20 % in the relevant 
market(s).90
Consequently, if pool agreements are indeed, able to fall within the category 
“production agreements”, those pools with a market share of 20% could fall within the 
scope of the Specialization Block exemption91.
4.3.3 Are shipping pools sharing the market, and consequently, falling under the 
prohibition of article 81 (1) e)?
Not only is price fixing a way of eliminating competition in the market for horizontal 
agreements. The members of these collaboration agreements can also restrict 
competition by “apportioning particular markets between themselves”.92 Market 
sharing is probably a much more comfortable means to charge higher rates than price 
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fixing. Among other reasons, market sharing agreements are much easier to monitor, 
and cartel members do not have to find a compromise on price level.
Legal literature has identified mainly two types of market sharing: geographical 
market sharing, where actors in the market provide services to certain areas and could 
perpetuate the isolation of others, while also preventing the integration in the common 
market; and market sharing according to the types of customers, where suppliers 
divide their participation in their market according to their clients, i.e. a firm which 
will only supply private customers, while other will supply public entities.
The Commission has usually focused on two concerns of market sharing under article
81 (1) EC Treaty: first of all, geographical market sharing and its incompatibility with 
the single market integration goal and, secondly, the prevention of market penetration. 
Shipping pools do not seem to be at the risk of contravening this provision. On the one 
hand, the characteristics of the tramp sector do not allow for geographical market 
sharing as the geographical tramp shipping market is global, and moreover the 
contracts of affreightment entered into can not be predictable beforehand as in liner 
shipping. Tramp services are not regular transport services between two fixed ports;
they operate the routes the market demands at a certain moment of time.
Consequently, geographical market sharing becomes per definition very difficult in the 
tramp sector, but not impossible.
On the other hand, market sharing as conceived by the ECJ jurisprudence requires
output limitation, a feature that is totally contrary of what the market reality in tramp 
shipping offers.93
Finally, the barriers of entering the market must be analyzed in every segment of the 
market, however, few barriers of entry can be said to be particular to the tramp 
shipping market. As in the majority of markets, a major capital investment can be 
expected at the earliest stages of entering the market, and also usual technological and 
management challenges that are present while entering the majority of markets. 
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Furthermore, shipping pools ease market entrance by their presence in a market 
segment, for instance, offering long term charters with “potential for a profit share in 
addition to hire and which secures a steady source of income for the vessel”.94
4.4 Competition constraints by effect in pool agreements
If an agreement does not have the object of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition in the common market, as it seems to be the case with shipping pools, 
then the next stage under the competition analysis under article 81 (1) EC Treaty will 
be asserting the restrictive effects of the agreement in the market. This is, indeed, a 
much more onerous mission both for the Commission and also for any other 
undertaking wishing to establish the inexistence of an anticompetitive practice under 
article 81 EC Treaty.
The effects of a restrictive practice can be identified in horizontal cooperation 
agreements by assessing “the economic context taking into account the nature of the 
agreement and the parties combined market power which together with structural 
factors determines the capability of the cooperation to face overall competition”.95
Furthermore, the Guidelines on the application of article 81 to maritime transport 
reiterate this principle and add that the effects of pool agreements in the neighbouring 
markets shall also be considered.96
4.4.1 The nature of the agreement
The Guidelines on the application of article 81 to maritime transport provide relevant 
guidance in order to assess the nature of the agreement in shipping pools. The factors 
to analyze are the existence of “clauses prohibiting members from being active in the 
same market outside the pool” (non-competition clauses) and the “exchanges of 
commercially sensitive information which could for example unduly influence the 
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competitive behaviour of pool member operating in the same market outside the pool 
in relation to the pools commercial policy”.97
Furthermore, it is added that “any links between pools should also be considered”, a 
sentence that has been criticised by its vagueness and that several submissions 
commenting the draft Guidelines wanted it either removed or clarified.98 Now, in the 
final version of the guidelines, some examples of links are provided, these are: links 
“in terms as management or members as well as cost and revenue sharing”.99
4.4.2 Which clauses could potentially have the effect of restricting competition?
There are a priori several clauses commonly contained in shipping pool agreements 
that can bring about competition concerns. Given that there is not an agreed standard 
form for pool agreements, the wording of these clauses can vary significantly, 
therefore, such clauses have to be analyzed on a case by case basis in order to 
determine whether, they do encourage anticompetitive-practices:
-Non competition clauses:
The DG Competition provides a general definition of a non-competition clause as 
being a “contractual clause bringing about a direct or indirect obligation causing the 
parties to an acquisition agreement, or at least one of them, not to manufacture, 
purchase, sell or resell independently goods or services which compete with the 
contract goods or services”.100
Non-competition clauses are not automatically void under article 81 (1) EC Treaty, 
and indeed, this type of clauses can sometimes be considered ancillary restrictions on 
competition, which are “clauses that do not constitute the primary object of the 
agreement, but are directly related to and necessary for the proper functioning of the 
objectives envisaged by the agreement”.101 The Commission has in many rulings 
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considered non-competition clauses as ancillary restrictions, and thus, allowed them, 
given the facts of the case.102Therefore, even if the competition clause can a priori 
bring about a restriction of competition, it will be tolerated if it is evident that it 
constitutes a “condition sine qua non” the transaction takes place. Non-competition 
clauses are also an issue under the Merger Regulation, and also there, it has to be 
considered the necessity of this kind of clauses in order for the merger to be properly 
implemented. 
In pool agreements the most common type of non-competition clause is the one stating 
that vessels of the same type committed to the pool can not engage in trade that is in 
competition with the activities of the pool. However, other non-competition clauses 
can be drafted in order to hinder pool participants from purchasing similar vessels to 
operate on their own or in other collaboration schemes. Lately, “no restriction on 
competition” clauses are also found in pool agreements. 
These clauses have to be analyzed in the basis of their indispensability and they could 
either have a neutral competition effect in the market, for instance, in the cases that 
“parent companies would not have the incentive to compete with each other in the 
market” anyway; 103 or they could have indeed competition effects up to a certain 
extent as in cases of “spill over” effects on other markets or the imposition of 
unnecessary burdens to competition (in the case for example that the competition 
restrictions were “unconnected to the specific business of the pool”.104 However, it 
may be an issue to analyze and discuss whether collaboration schemes in certain 
sectors of the market eliminate incentives for small shipowners to grow by themselves 
and to compete outside the pool of their membership.
To sum up, it can be concluded that generally non-competition clauses in pool 
agreements should only be included when they are strictly necessary for the 
collaboration scheme to be workable (condition sine qua non). Special attention should 
be devoted to them at the drafting stage of the pool agreement.
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-Exit clauses: 
This type of clauses is designed to provide the patterns of a business partnership” 
break-up”. Defining the rights and obligations of a commercial partner at an earlier 
stage can solve many disputes at later stages of the business relationship. 
Normally a good exit clause will thoroughly define the rights and obligations of the 
parties while abandoning the partnership, and provide what will be done regarding 
assets, investments, equipment, etc. However, the obligations imposed on the party 
leaving the partnership can not be too burdensome and can sometimes awake
competition concerns. An example of this type of problem can be found in the 
European Night Services case, a case on rail transport where the Commissions’ claim 
that a joint venture agreement restricted competition between the parties to the 
agreement themselves and third party rail operators, was disregarded.
In pool agreements the most common type of exit clauses provides for certain 
requirements in order for individual vessels to abandon the collaboration scheme. 
Depending on the pool in question, termination provisions can provide for a longer or 
shorter notice period or for some minimum initial periods for new members, for 
instance. These clauses can potentially have negative effects in the market, and 
therefore, a thorough analysis of the economic context of the pool is required.
However, some arguments from the European Night Services case can be extrapolated 
here, and the review of all the facts can also follow in the case of a shipping pool to 
the finding that the pool does not violate the competition provisions in the EC treaty.
This could be the case when the termination clause is also indispensable, for instance, 
when two vessels are pooled to perform a long-lasting contract of affreightment. If 
when one of the vessels decided to leave the cooperation scheme, the other one would
be unable to perform its obligations under the contract of affreightment, thus the 
inclusion of a termination clause would have to be regarded as indispensable, and 
therefore, should not be held to contravene article 81 (1) EC Treaty.
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-Information exchange system: 
Flows of information within shipping pools are also an important factor to take into 
account. The market can not be too transparent in order to exist competition between 
pool participants. The Fearnley report established that “none of the pool agreements 
assessed contained provisions for information sharing other than information 
necessary to operate the pool”.105Even if the term “necessary” was not defined in the 
agreements evaluated, it seems logical that it would be the will of the parties to limit 
the information flow to a minimum, especially information regarding types of 
commercial operations that are outside the scope of the pool, future projects, etc. 
However, this should be evaluated in the light of each individual clause in order to 
search for potential competition infringements.
Finally, other types of pool agreement clauses that could have the effect to restrict 
competition must be specially examined, such as space sharing agreements, bilateral 
contracts of affreightment or joint outsourcing of the management of the vessel.
4.4.3 Market power of the members to a collaboration agreement
While considering the anti-competitive effects of an agreement, the analysis of the 
position of the parties on the market is fundamental. 
The Guidelines on horizontal cooperation provide that the starting point is the 
definition of the relevant market, and therefore, the Notice on Market Definition and 
especially in tramp shipping, the Guidelines on the application of article 81 to 
maritime transport are to be considered. Moreover, the next step is the analysis of the 
market shares in the market.106
Market shares reflect the market power of the undertaking in the market and according 
to the guidelines the relevance of the market shares, Richard Whish summarizes the 
provisions of the Guidelines as follows:107
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ECJ jurisprudence has also addressed this issue in several cases. One of those is the 
above cited European Night Services, which states: 
Where horizontal agreements between undertakings reach or only very 
slightly exceed the 5% threshold regarded by the Commission itself as 
critical and such as to justify application of Article 81(1) of the Treaty, 
the Commission must provide an adequate statement of its reasons in 
relation to the analytical data examined, particularly with regard to the 
market shares of the undertakings concerned, for concluding that the 
essential elements of a situation in which Article 81 applies are in fact 
present, unless such data were not challenged by the parties during the 
prior administrative procedure.108
In the case of shipping pools, further guidance in order to calculate market shares is 
found in the Guidelines.109
What is more, the Guidelines also point out that if a pool has a low market share, it is 
unlikely to be caught by the prohibition of article 81 (1) EC Treaty.110This 
presumption is, however, contested from an economic point of view. When a pool has 
a low market share but contains a hardcore restriction it will be caught by article 81 (1)
EC Treaty. Economists believe that if this low threshold is satisfied, even a hardcore 
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50% An undertaking with a market share of more than 50% is presumed to be dominant
40% An undertaking of more than 40% may be dominant
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exemption under R&D agreements
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10% An undertaking with a market share bellow 10% will usually benefit from the de 
minimis doctrine
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restriction of an individual actor in the market would have very little impact in the 
market.111
Other structural factors are mentioned in the Guidelines in order to be considered 
while carrying out the competition analysis: “market concentration, the position and 
the number of competitors, the stability of the market shares over time, multi-
membership in pools, market-entry barriers and the likelihood of entry, market 
transparency, countervailing buying power of transport users and the nature of the 
services should be taken into account as additional factors in the assessing the impact 
of a given pool in the relevant market”.112
The Fearnley report provides a thorough analysis of all the segments in the tramp 
shipping market, including approximate market shares of the actors in the sector, 
dealing both with pools and independent actors.
4.5 Do pooling agreements affect trade within the Member States and restrict 
competition within the common market?
Article 81 (1) EC Treaty prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States”. The effect on trade requirement is very widely interpreted in EC 
jurisprudence. Proof of this liberal interpretation is the ruling in Societe Technique 
Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm when the ECJ ruled that in order to establish the inter-
member state effect on trade “it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of 
probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement 
in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential on the pattern 
of trade between member states”.113 Moreover, the Commission has provided further 
guidance in the effect on trade by Guidelines on the effect of trade concept contained 
in articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, and also in the Guidelines of the application of article 
81 to maritime transport, where several paragraphs deal with this subject.114Finally, 
there is jurisprudence specifically dealing with the effect on trade on maritime 
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transport services. In the CMBT case the ECJ ruled that in order to establish the effect 
on trade of an agreement between providers of liner transport services, it is sufficient 
that such services relate to transport to or from Community ports. 115This ruling is 
easily extrapolated to the tramp shipping sector, as tramp services can usually relate to 
transport to or from community ports.116
Therefore, given all these features it is possible to conclude, as the Fearnley report also 
does, that the inter-state trade test is likely to be satisfied by all the pool arrangements 
acting within the European market.117Nevertheless, this is has to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis.
4.6 “The de minimis doctrine”
Finally, while dealing with market shares and the impact of inter-state trade it is 
necessary to mention that there are some agreements that are specifically excluded 
from vulnerating EC competition provisions due to their weak effects in the market or 
their almost inexistent impact in the inter-state trade. This is known as the “de minimis 
doctrine”.
This doctrine states that “an agreement falls outside the prohibition of article 81 when 
it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position 
which the persons concerned have on the market or the product in question”.118The 
Commission, therefore, will not usually investigate those horizontal or vertical 
agreements which have a market share of 10 or 15 per cent or less, which do not 
constitute hardcore restrictions.119
This doctrine first formulated in ECJ’ s case law of, is considerably importance as 
many agreements that do not fulfill the thresholds established escape the need to notify 
and the possibility of being prohibited. 120The Commission has provided guidance on 
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this doctrine in a series of Notices, the last one dating from 2001.121Even if this 
doctrine is usually applied, there have been some cases that have shown the limits of 
the doctrines, such cases have as a common characteristic that all took place in 
extremely oligopolistic markets.122
The main limit of this doctrine regards certain hardcore restrictions. The Notice 
specifically names certain type of agreements to which the “de minimis doctrine” does 
not apply, among those: horizontal agreements to fix prices, limit output or sales and 
to allocate market or customers”.123 Consequently, not even if such hardcore 
restrictions fall under the thresholds set by the Commission, would these agreements
be provided with a safe harbour.124
4.7 Application of article 81 (3) EC to Shipping Pools
Any agreement which restricts competition under article 81 (1) EC Treaty, whether by 
its effects or by its object, may in principle benefit from an exemption under Article 
81(3) EC Treaty; 125 however object infringements are very unlikely to satisfy 81 (3)
because, as stated above, there is a “sliding scale”, according to which, “the greater the 
restriction of competition found under Article 81(1), the greater the efficiencies and 
the pass-on to consumers must be”.126
Therefore, even if an agreement is caught by article 81 (1) EC Treaty, it is not 
automatically void pursuant to article 81 (2) if it satisfies the requirements for 
exemption under 81 (3). 
Article 81 (3) EC Treaty has been subject to different enforcement regimes in the last 
decades. Under the old framework regulation for the enforcement of the competition 
provisions of the EC treaty, regulation 17/62, the Commission had “the sole power” to 
apply article 81 (3) to agreements notified to it. 127 In the current competition regime 
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with the passing of the “modernization regulation”, Regulation 1/2003, article 81 (3)
EC Treaty becomes directly applicable and it is now enforceable by both the 
Commission and the National Authorities. “Individual exemptions” under this article
do no longer exist, and it is up the undertakings and their lawyers to conduct a “self-
assessment” of their compliance with competition rules.128
In order for article 81 (3) EC Treaty to be applicable four cumulative conditions must 
be satisfied: efficiency gains, fair share for consumers of the resulting benefits, 
indispensability of the restrictions and no elimination of competition. An alternative 
way of falling into the scope the article is when agreements satisfy the conditions of 
one of the block exemptions issued by the Commission. In such cases, individual 
notification is not necessary and the agreement is valid and enforceable automatically.
The Commission has issued general guidance on the application of article 81 (3) EC 
Treaty in order to help undertakings carry out their “self-assessment” and also specific 
guidelines on the application of this article to shipping pools.129
It is remarkable the change that the Guidelines on the application of competition to 
maritime transport have suffered in this point from the draft to its final version. The 
draft version of the Guidelines barely incorporated three vague and short paragraphs 
on this point, without providing much information. In its final version, the guidelines
devote a whole page to this issue, illustrating each point with examples and giving to 
this issue the relevance it merits.
4.7.1 Efficiency gains
The first requirement imposed by article 81 (3) EC Treaty is that the agreement 
“contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economical progress”. Even if the provision expressly deals with goods, it 
is per analogy applicable to services.130
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The efficiencies have to be objective, and they have to provide benefits to the 
Community as a whole and not merely to the undertakings involved in the 
agreement.131 Moreover, the nature of the claimed efficiencies, their likelihood and 
magnitude and how and when they would be achieved must be verified, and last but 
not least, also the link between the agreement and the efficiencies has to be 
evidenced.132 The Guidelines distinguish between two broad types of efficiencies: cost 
efficiencies and dynamic efficiencies, where value is measured by new or improved 
products/services.
The Guidelines on the application of article 81 EC to maritime transport provide some 
examples as to the efficiencies that can be argued from the shipping pools’ side: 
“better utilisation rates and economies of scale”, “jointly plan vessels to spread their 
fleets geographically” and “reduction of the number of ballast voyages which may 
increase overall capacity utilisation of the pool and lead to economies of scale”.133
Shipping pools can benefit from the following efficiency gains of economies of 
scale:134
-Cost efficiencies: 
The fact that the pool manager is marketing the fleet as a cohesive unit means less 
management costs, and can create efficiencies both “in terms of vessel operation and 
utilisation”. Many costs can be saved with this joint marketing, among them: crew 
costs, supplies costs, savings on IT material, marketing costs, and staff costs in 
general.
-Dynamic efficiencies:
-Larger fleets mean increased capacity, more flexibility for shippers and finally, better 
and more adequate services, or to put it short, higher capacity utilisation and output.
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-Larger shippers are able to be targeted and larger contracts of affreightments easier to 
be obtained with an increased fleet. Moreover, large clients can be furnished with 
specialized vessels required for their trades, and such vessels can be built specially to 
satisfy the need of particular clients.
-Customers enjoy also the benefit of dealing with larger companies that offer both 
flexibility and reliability, the security that long-term business relations provide is 
highly relevant in the shipping industry; lower trading risks; and finally, quality and 
technical improvements.
-Pooling of resources means more possibilities of investing in research and 
development.
It seems from the wording of the final Guidelines that the Commission is, nowadays, 
increasingly eager to acknowledge the efficiency gains that shipping pools might bring 
to the market. 
4.7.2 Consumer pass-on
Economic benefits have to favour consumers, too, and not only the parties to the 
agreement.135 The concept of fair share has not been elaborated further by the 
Commission, however it is generally understood to mean that the efficiency gains have 
to be passed on to the consumers, i.e. for example if competition pressure is 
transmitted to the customers in the form of lower prices. Such benefits have to be 
balanced as a whole to consider their positive/negative impacts in competition.
The Guidelines on the application of competition to maritime transport also deal with 
the point on consumer pass-on and point out that the following factors needs to be 
considered to determine that the efficiencies have a consumer pass-on: “consumers 
must receive a fair share of the efficiencies generated”, “beneficial effects” must be 
assessed collectively and not individually; the pass-on must at least compensate 
consumers for potential negative effects caused by competition restrictions”; and 
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lastly, also “the structure of the market and the elasticity of the demand” must be taken 
into account.136
Some of the benefits that shipping pools provide to the consumers in the market are 
the following:
-Better flexibility of services and, consequently, wider choice span for customers.
-More commercial flexibility for cargo shippers in what COAs are concerned.
-Easier access to port equipment and port facilities in general.
-More reliability and lower transactional costs.137
Also in this point, the Commission seems to be increasingly willing to acknowledge
the consumer pass-on when certain market conditions are given.
4.7.3 Indispensability
Indispensability in this context means that no other practicable and less restricting way 
of achieving the efficiency gains exists, such a restriction is, therefore, “necessary to 
achieve the economic benefits”.138
The Guidelines establish that what is necessary to examine is whether “the parties 
could have achieved the efficiencies on their own”, “what was the minimum efficient 
scale to provide various types of services” and also what the individual clauses of the 
agreement provide. However such clauses “may be justified for a longer period or the 
whole life of the pool or for a transitional period only”139.
This indispensability test has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account all of the elements mentioned above. Furthermore, the party applying for 
exemption has to carry out a detailed analysis of the indispensability of restrictions 
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that the agreement in question can cause in the market, otherwise, the exemption may
be disregarded.140
Yet, for our analysis, if a shipping pool is established for all the right reasons, non-
competition and termination clauses prove to be provisions sine qua non the pool can
not function, and moreover, a detailed review of the indispensability of the restriction 
of competition is provided, it will be more than likely that the potential competition 
restrictions provided for in the pool agreement are indispensable.
4.7.4 Elimination of competition in substantial parts of shipping services
The last cumulative requirement is that elimination of competition in the market is 
prohibited. The Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) provide that “where an 
undertaking is dominant or becoming dominant as a consequence of a horizontal 
agreement, an agreement which produces anti-competitive effects in the meaning of 
article 81 can in principle not be expected”.141
The Guidelines on the application of article 81 to maritime transport add that “the pool 
must not be afforded the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the services in question”.142This formulation was the only one 
regarding article 81 (3) that has suffered no modifications from the draft version.
Competition effects are to be analysed in the context of the market power of the 
undertakings in the relevant market, and potential effects in other markets.
Firstly, the Fearnley report has concluded that there is no evidence that “pools have 
been able to use their joint resources and combined market power to push prices up at 
any time in any segment of the history”.143Secondly, the tramp shipping market has 
historically been regarded as a highly competitive market.144However, a study of every 
segment of the market in question has to be conducted, and pools with high market 
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shares in a market that face weaker competition from outside the pool may be at risk. 
Consequently, it is necessary for the purpose of this provision to exclude any risk of 
abuse of market power or elimination of competition in the relevant market.
4.8 Conclusions: general compliance of Shipping Pools with articles 81 (1) and
(3) EC
First of all, shipping pools will generally fulfil the first three preliminary requirements 
under article 81 (1) EC Treaty: they can be considered “agreements of undertakings” 
or “concerted practices”, they are indeed undertakings due to the fact that they carry 
out an economic activity, and last but not least, in the big majority of cases they will 
be found to have an effect on intra-member state trade.
Whether shipping pools have as an object and effect restriction, distortion and 
limitation of competition is a question that has to be closely looked at on a case by 
case basis. It seems that shipping pools in the vast majority of cases will be quite 
unlikely to fail the “object test” in article 81 (1) EC Treaty, with the only exceptions 
being pools engaged involved in hardcore competition restrictions such as pure price-
fixing practices or in certain information sharing schemes. Therefore, the uncertainty 
under the actual competition law regime lies on the” effect test” under this article. 
For the effect test it will be necessary to consider the appreciability and the market 
effects of the agreements, and this is an analysis that is only possible to carry out on a 
case-by-case basis. The anticompetitive effects would be dependant on the nature of 
the agreement and on the market power of the undertaking in question, assessed in the 
basis of its market shares in the relevant market. Agreements reaching certain 
thresholds may be held to contravene article 81 (1) EC Treaty while agreements 
falling under certain thresholds would be not caught thanks to the de minimis doctrine.




“Low risk” pools are those pools that are very unlikely to breach article 81 (1) and 
that, therefore, almost always fall outside of the scope of this provision.
-Pools that are not actual or potential competitors: such pools are rare in the tramp 
shipping market, as one of the usual characteristics of the pools is that they market 
vessels to supply the same market, and therefore, the fleet is quite homogeneous and 
competes among itself. However, it could be possible to have a pool that markets its 
ships in different segments of the market, or that serves complementary segments. In 
those cases, pools would not be direct competitors for business. This type of 
agreement is said to be found in, for example, when the KG structure is used in the 
two Jacob-Scorpio tanker pools.145
-Pools that are competing companies that cannot by any means provide the service 
covered individually: There are plenty of pools that have been established to provide 
services that the members would not be able to individually provide and to win larger 
contracts that otherwise would not be possible to bid for. Pools in which small 
shipowning companies join forces to be more attractive in the market are likely to fall 
under this category. For this requirement to be fulfilled it is not necessary that the pool 
has the sole purpose to tender contracts of affreightment146. 
-Pools whose activity does not influence the relevant parameters of competition 
because they are of minor importance: the Fearnley report identifies two types of 
agreements that can be presumed to fall in this category: “purely technical 
information-exchanging agreements covering technical matters such as ISM and ISPS 
Code compliance, class issues, environmental law and technology , crew or vessel 
safety” and “exchanges of information comprising solely historical statistical 
information of the sort held not to fall within art 81 (1) case law”.147
  
145 Fearnley report (2006) p. 331
146 This is a signficant change from the Draft Guidelines, where this sole purpose was required.
147 Fearnley report (2006) p. 330 
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-Pools whose activity does not appreciably affect trade between Member States: Given 
that usually the scope of the tramp shipping pools is global, pools falling into this 
category can not be excluded. A pool can operate outside the European Union and 
have little repercussion on the European transport market.
These four categories of low risk pools are unlikely to fail the tests under article 81 (1)
EC Treaty, therefore if they are assessed under the “rule of reason” they will not often 
contravene this article. Nevertheless, if such pools are involved in hardcore 
competition restrictions, if they have a significant market power and/or also prevent 
competition for competitors in the market, they could breach article 81 (1) EC Treaty, 
and therefore self-assessment under 81 (3) EC Treaty will be the possible way out.148
If the Commission initiates an investigation against this type of pools it is quite likely 
to be abandoned at one of the earliest stages of the process. 
-Mid- risk Pools
These are a type of pools that the Guidelines calls “agreements that almost always fall 
under Article 81 (1)”. In principle, they do not have the object of restricting 
competition as such, albeit, they might fail the effects test under Article 81 (1). The 
Guidelines give as an example of this case, pools that are engaged in joint scheduling 
or joint purchasing, such pools would only be subject to articles’ 81 (1) analysis when 
the companies involved have a certain degree of market power.149
These undertakings must be analyzed in the basis of their market power and other 
structural and functional factors in the relevant market, and last but not least, the 
impact of their effects in trade must be assessed in order to identify anti-competitive 
practices. If such undertakings breach article 81 (1) EC Treaty, they should carry out a 
self assessment in terms of article 81 (3) EC Treaty. If the requirements established in 
article 81 (3) EC Treaty can be proved to be achieved, then the pool will be cleared. If 
not, then it would be prohibited under EC competition law.
  
148 Fearnley report (2006) p.330
149 Guidelines maritime transport (2008)  p.15
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-High risk Pools
This category of pools is almost always a contravention of EC competition law. Their 
practices are regarded as dangerous for the well functioning of the internal market and 
significant fines are to be expected according to the latest EC policy punishing cartels.
Pools that are likely to breach article 81 (1) EC Treaty entail hardcore competition 
restrictions, for instance, pools that are involved into price fixing, output limitation, 
market sharing or customers. 
These pools with a high risk of non-compliance are in danger of contravening EC 
Competition law. They have three options available: prove that they fulfil the 
requirements of 81 (3) EC Treaty, which will not often be the case in hardcore 
restrictions, also because there is a “sliding scale”, according to which, “the greater the 
restriction of competition found under Article 81(1) EC Treaty, the greater the 
efficiencies and the pass-on to consumers must be”; 150 reconsider their activities and 
abandon the anticompetitive practices; or restructure themselves as a full function joint 
ventures or merge, in order to fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. This last 
seems to be the most suitable option and the one that will provide these pools with a 
higher level of legal security.
Normally, undertakings being caught by EC Competition law can face very high fines 
imposed by the European Commission -EC Competition law provides for a maximum 
fine of 10% of an undertakings´ total turnover in the former business year, and 
moreover periodic penalty payments can be imposed151. It is also important to remark 
that processes in Brussels are usually long and entail particularly high legal costs. On 
the other hand, in the EC jurisdiction, the Commission has no power to fine natural 
persons or charge them with imprisonment penalties.
Finally, if pools are caught by article 81 (1) EC Treaty there is still a possibility for 
clearance under EC Competition law, and this is self-assessment under article 81 (3) 
EC treaty. It is clear that this self-assessment must be carried out on a case by case 
  
150 Guidelines maritime transport (2008) p.16
151 Regulation 1/2003 art 23, art 24
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basis. However, on the context of shipping pools it can be affirmed that if an
agreement implies an object violation of article 81 (1) EC Treaty, it will be extremely 
difficult to satisfy the four cumulative requirements of article 81 (3) EC Treaty. On the 
other hand, shipping pools are apt to primarily fulfil the four conditions established by 
such article.
To sum up, it seems that a priori not many pools seem to be at risk in the new 
maritime transport competition legislative framework. Pools with a high market power 
and collusive practices are targeted, but it does not seem that the standard shipping 
pool responds to such a description. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to follow how 
the Commission applies the regulation and also the potential developments or 
modifications of the Guidelines after the period of five years for revision provided for 
in the regulation.
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V. Present and Future challenges in EC maritime competition 
EC maritime competition law has increasingly been in the public eye ever since the 
Lisbon Strategy pointed at maritime transport as one of the sectors that urged for a 
renovated competition policy. After years of debate, the adoption of Regulation 
1419/2006 did not only mean that all sectors of the maritime transport industry now
fall within the enforcement powers of the Commission but has also brought many
other novelties for all segments of the sector.
In liner shipping, the repeal of the block exemption for liner conferences meant 
nothing but a revolution. Price fixing will no longer be permitted after the 18th of 
October 2008 and the liner market has had two years to adjust to this change. 
However, it seems that there are still some issues that are not completely clear in the
new regime, the main issue needing a clearer treatment is information exchanges 
between competitors in the liner market, whose formulation as it is opens the road for 
plenty of debate.
In the field of tramp shipping, apart from the new enforcement regime, some points 
deserve a brief comment. First of all, the definition of the tramp shipping market is 
still a very complicated issue to tackle and it has not been addressed clearly enough by 
the Commission through all these years. Secondly, the final version of the Guidelines 
on maritime transport restates the line of thought that the Commission has followed 
until now. However, the guidelines provide for a revision period in 5 years time, 
therefore, only time will tell how useful the current guidelines really are and how 
much changes they will suffer in the near future. And last, but not least, it is still to see 
how this regulation will be applied and how much litigation it will bring with it.
The legal problems around the compliance of shipping pools with the new EC 
competition law are still depending on the Commissions future approach to shipping 
pools. A priori, it can not be categorically affirmed that shipping pools contravene EC 
Competition law per se, as this was the case with most liner conference agreements. 
Nevertheless, the practical application of the Regulation 1419/2006 in this field is still 
to be seen. Particularly challenging is the question of how far the Commission will 
57
apply the concept of price fixing to shipping pools. A narrow concept of price fixing in 
this field would most certainly mean that while shipping pools would be allowed
under EC competition law per se, and the standard shipping pool concept accepted, the 
essence of their existence, the fact that pool members bring together their vessels and 
jointly operate, would be illegal. This paradoxical approach is clearly not acceptable. 
On the other hand, too wide a concept can differ with the established doctrine set by 
European jurisprudence on price fixing. Lastly, more clarity is needed on the key 
feature of shipping pools as the current formulation” joint selling coupled with 
features of joint production” is quite obscure.
Tramp shipping is indeed a highly competitive sector, and even if each pool has to be 
analyzed individually in order to assess its compliance with the new regime, it seems 
that not many shipping pools are nowadays in a position that could contravene the new 
EC competition regime. Therefore, it seems that the big majority of pools will not be 
forced to merge or restructure in order to comply with the new regulatory framework. 
Pools were established for all the right reasons and the strongest argument to their 
favour is that, as seen in this work, they strongly enhance competition in the shipping 
market and they increase the quality, quantity and flexibility of services to the 
customers in the market. Some studies point also that if pools were no longer to exist, 
freight rates would become volatile and higher and the reliability and flexibility of the 
services offered will be much poorer. This volatility in the market would be likely to 
be passed on to customers, and prices would be likely to rise, especially in the context 
of periods of economic recession such as the one that is not being experienced. Let us 
not forget that shipping is a sector where exogenities (especially oil prices) have 
enormous repercussions.
Last but not least, the debate on maritime competition law is still bound to go on for 
the next decades. There are still many issues that are likely to be object of the study of 
the Commission, among those, the potential revision of the block exemption for 
consortia, the application of competition law to cabotage and ferry services, and lastly, 
a borderline question with Insurance law: the legal status of the International Group of 
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